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"...And Women Must Weep" v. "Anatomy
of a Lie": An Empirical Assessment
of Two Labor Relations
Propaganda Films*
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR. and JUANITA V. FIELD**
I. INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to bring some "relevance" into the mossy halls of
legal academia, extracurricular arrangements were made for a
showing of two well-known films' which had been discussed in the
context of a labor law class. 2 An evening program was set up8
* The authors wish to express gratitude to the law firm of Navarre,
Rizor & DaPore of Lima, Ohio, for their generous provision of secretarial
assistance.
** Thomas G. Field, Jr.: J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M., New
York University; currently engaged in research in regulatory public law.
Juanita V. Field: Ph.D., West Virginia University, currently an Assistant
Professor of Psychology at Ohio State University.
1. ". . . And Women Must Weep" is available for rental from the
National Right to Work Committee, 1900 L St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
The film is in color and is a 28-minute, 16mm reel, renting for $15.00
generally and $7.00 for educational purposes. "Anatomy of a Lie" is
available from the AFL-CIO Film Division, 815 Sixteenth St., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. It is an 18-minute, black and white, 16mm reel, costing
$3.00 per rental.
2. See, e.g., MELTZER, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS,
101-103 (Little, Brown and Co., 1970).
3. February, 1971.
and two of its major components were billed as a management-in-
spired film depicting union violence 4 and a union rebuttal of the
former.5
More as an intellectual exercise than anything, an unannounced
twist was planned: the organizers of the program decided to
breach some hallowed law school traditions and conduct an experi-
ment6 to determine for themselves the impact of the notorious 7
".... And Women Must Weep" on the unsuspecting public-as well
as the merits of the rebuttal film. All of the details were arranged,
4. A flyer advertising the film reads:
".. . And Women Must Weep" the motion picture that shows how
COMPULSORY UNIONISM breeds strike violence . . . Bloodshed
... Destruction. A documentary of VIOLENCE. . . "And Women
Must Weep" is more than a recitation of the facts surrounding the
violence that flared during a wildcat strike in the small town of
Princeton, Indiana, in 1958. It's documented proof of what hap-
pens in a situation made possible by the compulsory union shop;
in short, what happens when irresponsible union leadership cannot
be called to account ....
The strike brought on waves of violence and left scars which the
daily local newspaper said might not heal for 25 years. The vio-
lence hit its crest when the four month old baby of a non-striker
was shot in the head while lying in her crib; until that sickening
moment, nobody knew how far union professionals were willing to
go to preserve their free ride on the backs of their members.
COURT APPROVED! The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled that ". . . And Women Must Weep" may be shown to newly-
hired employees-that it does not violate the Taft-Hartley Act. In
his decision, Circuit Judge Bell said that both sides in a labor dis-
pute have the right to express opinions .... He further observed
that, while the film is professionally staged, "the record is barren
of evidence showing that it is false or even exaggerated."
[The quote from Judge Bell can be read in context in Southwire Co. v.
NLRB, 383 F.2d at 240. This case is discussed infra.]
5. AFL-CIO, FILMS FOR LABOR, 17 (1971); there the film, "Anatomy
of a Lie" is described as follows:
This film was produced to set the record straight by exposing
the outrageous lies in the viciously anti-labor National Right to
Work Committee film .... Using a series of clips from the right-
to-work film to present the background story as presented in that
film, the IAM proceeds to expose the lie and document the truth
through a series of on-the-scenes interviews with people who had
been involved in the strike. It is not necessary to see the right-
to-work film in order to use "Anatomy of a Lie" effectively. This
is a fascinating study in propaganda techniques.
6. Concerning the status of this type of research in the law, see gen-
erally: Cavers, Non-Traditional Research by Law Teachers: Returns from
the Questionnaires of the Council on Law Related Studies, 24 J. LEGAL ED.
534 (1972). Concerning the special relevance of this type of research here,
see General Shoe, note 27 infra.
7. See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
tion Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
38, 65 (1964). "Anyone who has endured the film '. . . And Women Must
Weep' may justifiably regret that labor relations should call forth propa-
ganda of this kind." See also, Beaunit, note 94, infra, at 115.
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and on the evening of the program, when all were seated, a leaflet
was distributed containing the following directions:
In attempting to evaluate the films you are about to see, we are
requesting your aid in a small experiment.
Please try to imagine yourself as an employee in a small plant
here in Smalltown, U.S.A., and assume that there have been recent
attempts to organize that plant by a national union. Of course,
the union has promised all of the sorts of things which unions
promise, and the owners have responded with the usual manage-
ment arguments against the need for a union.
Assuming the election is right now, please vote for or against the
union in your plant by writing "yes" or "no", respectively, on the
ballot we are furnishing.
Thank you for your cooperation.
No one walked out as a result of being confronted with this un-
expected exercise, and most, if not all of those present, marked
one of the three color-coded ballots which were then distributed
to each person.8 The lights were dimmed, and everyone sat back
to be propagandized by the management film. Following that and
the same directions as earlier, a second ballot was marked and col-
lected, and the lights were again dimmed for "Anatomy of a Lie."
By the time the lights were back on after the second movie, most
of the audience had already marked the third ballot. In any event,
the directions were again given, and the last of the ballots were
collected. The program was then turned over to a speaker while
all the ballots were eagerly taken to another room for inspection.
There were two major surprises that evening. One of those was
discovering that, contrary to expectations created by reading a de-
scription of the first film in an NLRB decision, 9 the films did not
directly confront the interesting issue of whether unions are good
or bad; rather, they addressed the issue of whether "right to work"
8. There were perhaps 30 people present, from whom we received
about 20 complete, usable sets of ballots. No effort was made to survey
the sample for sex or like variable. The fact that as many as half of the
group were students then taking labor law, and other such factors, made
the results subject to considerable criticism. As noted, supra, this survey
was more in the nature of an attempt to satisfy idle curiosity than any-
thing else. For that reason, no attempt was made to retain and tabulate
what data was received and there is little merit here in going into detail
as to the procedure used.
9. Note 2, supra: Plochman and Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc.,
140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Cherry Lane]. Likewise, the
National Labor Relations Board will be cited as NLRB or simply the Board.
laws should be enacted in the various states under authority of
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 10 The second unexpected
development was that, after all three ballots were cast by all of
the participants in the experiment, management lost in the aggre-
gate by two votes, i.e., between the first and third ballots, there
were two fewer votes against the union."
What made the discovery unexpected was the knowledge that,
since 1962, the NLRB had upset approximately half a dozen rep-
resentation elections where management had shown ". . . And
Women Must Weep" to its employees prior thereto (and the union
had lost).12 More than once, this was after the union had also
shown the rebuttal film to the same employees. Further, in addi-
tion to upsetting elections, the NLRB had decided, in most of the
same cases, as well as others, that the employer was guilty of an
unfair labor practice and therefore ordered it, under sanction of the
Act,13 to cease and desist from again showing the film to its em-
ployees. 14
While the first showing of the films and the tentative experi-
mental evaluation of their propaganda impact left much to be
desired from a scientific viewpoint,' 5 more than a germ of doubt
was planted as to the wisdom of the Board in pursuing its policy
toward the admittedly anti-union film. For this reason, and be-
cause the courts had consistently refused to enforce Board orders
10. The official title of the act is Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964). That section allows states, at their option,
to enact legislation abolishing situations where an employee is required to
belong to a union as a condition of employment. Such state laws, where
enacted, give the employee the "right to work" without having to neces-
sarily belong to a union, forbidding union-employer arrangements to the
contrary.
11. E.g., on the first ballot it may have been 10 "yes" and 10 "no" bal-
lots, whereas it would have been 12 "yes" and 8 "no" ballots on the third
and final ballot-see note 8, supra.
12. The cases are discussed in the paper. As to the act, insofar as it is
remedial and not punitive, there is little point in attempting action against
an employer who was technically in the wrong but did not benefit from
it. Results in Section III of this paper, infra, indicate that this could have
happened quite frequently.
13. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq.
Section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), provides that the Board shall issue "an
order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice and to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the
policies of this Act: . .. ."
14. See discussion and cases in Section II B. of this paper, infra.
15. See note 8, supra. One serious failing in the procedure could pos-
sibly have been the showing of the films back-to-back rather than pro-
viding a time gap between their showing as is most apt to be the case in
practice.
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in such cases, 16 it seemed worthwhile to examine the problem fur-
ther: first, by a detailed analysis of the law, and second, by con-
ducting a second and more closely controlled experiment to get a
more precise evaluation of not only the impact of the first movie,
but also the relative persuasive merits of both films.
In approaching these goals, arrangements were again made to
obtain the films17 and show them. This time, the audience was to
consist of about 75 students of both sexes and somewhat scattered
ages enrolled in a two-year, state supported technical college.' 8
That data was collected in the late spring of 1972.
Thus, it is the purpose here: (1) to sketch, in some detail, the
legal environment within which the second experiment must be
evaluated; (2) to describe that experiment's design, execution and
results; and, finally, (3) to discuss some conclusions that may be
drawn concerning the possible impact of this experimental evalu-
ation of the films on the rules that have heretofore regulated their
use in labor relations. These ends will be pursued, respectively.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because of the intricacies of National Labor Relations Board pro-
cedures in the area of freedom of speech standards, it seems worth-
while to divide this section of the paper into two parts. The first
provides a general sketch of the workings of the Board in this area.
The second analyzes in detail the problems generated by the prop-
aganda films within the context of the former.
A. Summary Analysis of Basic Problems
Fundamental to an understanding of some of the interesting is-
sues generated by employer use of the movie, ". . . And Women
Must Weep", is an appreciation of a basic dichotomy of National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction. That dichotomy centers about
the distinction between representation proceedings and unfair la-
16. See Section II B. of this paper, infra, generally.
17. The authors would like to point out here that they were recipients
of very prompt and courteous service from both film sources. In fact,
after locating the AFL-CIO as a source for the second film, "Anatomy of
a Lie," it was they who generously provided us with the information for
the source of the first.
18. Lima Technical College, Lima, Ohio.
bor practice proceedings. Not only do the procedures for their
resolution generally differ, but the substantive issues may be dif-
ferent also.
Different provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are involved as well,
i.e., under Section 9,19 the Board is under an obligation to resolve
problems generated by attempted collective representation of em-
ployees, whereas, under Section 10,20 it is the duty of the Board to
prevent unfair labor practices as defined by Section 8.21 These sec-
tions can be explained as creating Board obligations, respectively,
to regulate conduct which would (1) interfere with free em-
ployee choice in the context of an election or (2) interfere with
other employee rights,22 e.g., the right to engage in preliminary or-
ganizational activity which may significantly predate the necessity
for an election. Also, direct court is not available in representation
cases.
At the same time, the Board is subject to the dictates of the
First Amendment. It must use caution in its rulings to avoid over-
protecting labor or management at the expense of free speech.
Because the problems considered here involved only employer
misconduct, this discussion will be limited accordingly, but it is
important for the novice to keep in mind that unions are just as
likely as management to be the objects of Board scrutiny. A typi-
cal case will concern a plant which has no employee organization
to champion employee benefits before the employer. Under those
circumstances, at some point, an established labor organization
is apt either to be approached by a few disgruntled employees
or to initiate, on its own, an attempt to capture majority employee
sentiment.
More often than not, as soon as the employer becomes aware of
such activity among its employees, a campaign will be launched
spelling out in detail the disadvantages of injecting the presence of
a stranger into an allegedly theretofore cordial relationship. Some
employers, precisely because there have been good relations, are
able without engaging in conduct prohibited by the Act, to thwart
19. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). The subsection of primary interest here is
8(a) (1) which defines as an unfair labor practice employer interference,
restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise of "rights guaranteed in
Section 7.. . ." See note 22, infra.
22. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities . . ..
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organizational drives indefinitely. Others, however, resort to a
wide range of tactics calculated to prevent the meddling of stran-
gers in their affairs.
Not surprisingly, such tactics run a full spectrum from insipid
rhetoric to actual plant closure, with intermediates of vitriolic anti-
union propaganda, thinly veiled threats, and discharge of key or-
ganizational employees. Depending on the tone and extensiveness
of the employer's campaign or, to some extent, its timing, the em-
ployer may find itself defending the propriety of its conduct either
in a representation proceeding before a Regional Director or in an
unfair labor practice proceeding before a Trial Examiner.23
What is at stake in the former is the possibility of setting aside
an election which the employer has won and the holding of another
election (which it obviously may lose). What is involved in the
latter is usually a cease and desist order, prohibiting certain con-
duct, which is enforceable, via contempt proceedings, in the federal
appeals courts.24 Indeed in the latter, if an employer's conduct is
sufficiently reprehensible, it may be ordered to bargain with a ma-
jority union without benefit of an election or in spite of the union's
losing its majority as evidenced by an election already held. It may
be noted, however, that such an extraordinary remedy as the last
is not likely to follow the mere showing of a motion picture.25
While both representation and unfair labor practice proceedings
are reviewable by the Board, only the latter is immediately review-
able by the courts. Speaking of a pre-election representation con-
troversy, a court has said:28
A unit controversy must travel a circuitous route before it
reaches court.
23. The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
24. Section 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). Once the Board order
becomes a court order, it is enforceable as any court order; until that
time, no specific sanctions attach to failure to comply with a Board order.
Or a respondent before the Board can take the initiative and have the
order reviewed in a court of appeals under Section 10 (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (f).
But see Section 10 (g).
25. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
26. Local 1325, Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). See also AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Leedom v. Kyne,
358 U.S. 184 (1958).
Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, see Leedom v.
Kyne . . ., neither the original unit determination made prior to
the election, nor the final certification, is subject to direct judicial
review. Instead, a company wishing judicial review must refuse
to bargain with the certified union. This will ordinarily initiate an
unfair labor practice proceeding in which the employer can defend
on the ground that the certification was invalid, and may have
judicial review of the resulting Board order. Thus, in the case at
hand, the Company was required to invite an unfair labor practice
proceeding in order to bring the unit determination under judicial
scrutiny. (Emphasis added.)
Having thus roughly sketched the procedural differences be-
tween representational and unfair labor practice problems, the dif-
ferences in general substantive freedom of speech standards, to
the extent they exist, may be likewise summarized. In a landmark
Board decision combining both representation and unfair labor
practice problems generated by employer-employee communica-
tions, it was stated: 27
We do not subscribe to the view ... that the criteria applied by
the Board in a representation proceeding to determine whether cer-
tain alleged misconduct interfered with an election need neces-
sarily be identical to those employed in testing whether an unfair
labor practice was committed, although the result will ordinarily
be the same. In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to
provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the un-
inhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish those
conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been
fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too
low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted
over again. (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the pertinence of General Shoe28 in the context of
this paper in speaking of experiments, it is of special interest here
because of its timing. The decision came down in 1948 on the
heels of the Taft-Hartley amendments29 to the Wagner Act. 0
Therefore, the Board was in a bit of a quandary in attempting to
regulate the content of employer-employee communications in
light of the provisions of Section 8(c) which provides: 31
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
27. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
28. Id.
29. Cf. note 10, supra.
30. The official title of the Wagner Act was the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 1935. The LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act) amended the NLRB and
incorporated it in Title I in 1947, and through such amendments NLRA
§ 8(1) has become LMRA § 8(a) (1), etc. Cf. note 10, supra.
31. 29 U.S.C. 158(c) (1964).
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form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice under any provisions of this Act, if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
Insofar as employer communications which would interfere with
the proper holding of an election, in the absence of Section 8 (c),
would also ordinarily be the basis of an order to prohibit unfair
labor practices defined as interference with employee rights "to
self-organization", 3 2 the Board's attempted distinction between the
two was promptly criticized: 33
In refusing to extend the amendment's protection to election cases
the Board chose a novel and perhaps contradictory avoidance of
legislative purpose ....
That decision, while salvaging Board discretion in representation
cases, is nevertheless a dubious guarantee that elections will be
free. Since the Board may not order the cessation of conduct ex-
cept in the realm of unfair labor practices ....... the employ-
er's sole penalty is the inconvenience of submitting to another
election.
However, in spite of such criticism, the dichotomy in respect to
communications standards seems to thrive, as will be discussed
shortly. The Section 8(c) exemption of communications from reg-
ulation as unfair labor practices was discussed by the Supreme
Court in the Gissel case in 1969.34 There, in response to an em-
ployer assertion that its communications to its employees were pro-
tected under the First Amendment and Section 8(c), regardless of
their impact on union majority status or the ability of the Board
to conduct fair elections, the court reviewed the law and ob-
served:3
5
Within this framework, we must reject the Company's challenge
.... Thus, an employer is free to communicate to his employees
any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union, so long as the communications do
not contain a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
Moreover, the court observed that the employer should avoid
"brinksmanship" in its communications "by avoiding conscious
overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employ-
ees,"'3 6 and, in that case, because the employer had suggested to its
32. Note 22, supra.
33. 58 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1948).
34. Note 25, supra, at 616-620.
35. Id. at 618.
36. Id. at 620.
employees that the union's winning an election might result in
plant closure, the court upheld the Board's finding that such con-
duct was properly the basis both for upsetting the employer-won
election and for a cease and desist order based upon a violation
of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.3 7 In short, the employer had wan-
dered too close to the "brink", not only in respect to the election,
but also in respect to the unfair labor practice.
This is unfortunate, for it requires a search elsewhere for free-
dom of speech standards applicable only to representation proceed-
ings, i.e., those in which the employer has not made statements
which even verge on being threats or bribes. There seem to be
two sorts of these situations: (1) those in which communications
raise irrelevant and inflammatory matters, and (2) those in which
misstatements of fact may improperly influence rational employee
choice. Authority for the first seems to be largely limited to racial
matters. A typical case is the Board decision in Sewell, in 1962.38
There the issue of race was raised in a plant "on the Alabama
Border, in northwest Georgia," 9 and an illustrative item used was
a photograph of a white union officer dancing with a black woman.
In upsetting the employer-won election, it was said: 40
The Board has stated its practice as follows: The Board nor-
mally will not censor or police pre-election campaign propaganda
by parties to elections, absent threats or acts of violence .... The
ultimate consideration is whether the challenged propaganda has
lowered the standards of campaigning to the point where it may be
said that the uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be de-
termined in an election.
Continuing, the Board further noted that: 41
the burden will be on the party making use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and germane, and where
there is doubt as to whether the total conduct of such party is
within the described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against
him.
The standards for upsetting elections on the basis of misstate-
ments of fact, however, originate in another 1962 decision. In Hol-
lywood Ceramics,42 the Board stated that it would upset an election
only: (1) where there is a misrepresentation of a material fact, (2)
the facts are within the special knowledge of the party using them,
37. Note 22, supra.
38. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 70-71.
41. Id. at 72. For a general discussion of this specific problem, see
Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in
Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963).
42. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
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(3) the employees are not in a position to know the truth, and (4)
there is no opportunity for rebuttal by the opposite party. Even
in that situation, however, it was elaborated that elections need not
necessarily be upset because it is possible that the misrepresenta-
tion:43
* * * could have been so extreme as to put the employees on no-
tice as to its lack of truth under the particular circumstances so
that they could not reasonably have relied on the assertion.
In 1971, the Second Circuit, in Bausch & Lomb,44 cited this test
with approval pointing out not only that those standards have been
approved by all of the circuits, but also that it and the two other
circuits which had closely examined the fundamental issue were in
agreement that Section 8(c) of the Act does not limit Board discre-
tion in election cases, the conclusion being summarized as follows: 45
We recognize that the Board's laboratory standards may have a
minimal chilling effect on both the speech of the employer and the
union. The parties vying for the votes of the employees may be
reluctant to express themselves fully, fearing that an unintention-
ally false statement will be seized upon later in overturning an
election. But the incidental effects of regulation on the rights of
employer and union must be weighed against the interest of em-
ployees and the public at large in free, fair and informed repre-
sentation elections.
It it in this context that the employer-employee communication
achieved by the film "... And Women Must Weep" must be hence-
forth analyzed.
B. The Cases in Point
Since the first time the Board was confronted, in 1962, with
management use of ". . . And Women Must Weep, '46 it has written
eight decisions involving that film. Indeed, such cases have been
pending in practically every year over the past decade. Neverthe-
less, the number is manageable, and it will be worthwhile to con-
sider all of them in some detail.
Except for the one case in which an issue involving the film was
skirted for apparently technical reasons,47 the Board has upset elec-
43. Id. at 224.
44. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 879.
46. Note 9, supra.
47. Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964).
tions and/or issued unfair labor practice orders in all of them. This
is surprising, because as will be discussed further, of the six cases
appealable, four were taken to the courts; and in all of those, there
was a refusal to enforce the Board orders based upon use of the
film. While the first such upset occurred in 1967, it is interesting
to note, too, that these decisions were consistently ignored by the
Board until the most recent case, early in 1972, when the new chair-
man posted a footnote dissent citing these court analyses uniformly
opposing the Board position.48  As for the rebuttal film, no evi-
dence of its existence was found in Board decisions through the
very last, although the courts note that union use of "Anatomy of
a Lie" dates back to at least 1966,'4 and commented on it in three
of the four appealed cases.
In spite of the fact that "... And Women Must Weep" has
occupied so much attention, it was the principal issue in only the
first in this series of cases. It is therefore useful to keep in mind
that in the remainder of them, the result reached was at least ar-
guably obtained in part because of considerations having only the
most peripheral interest here.50 Aside from an occasional noting
of such considerations, the rest of this part of the paper will be
concerned with a chronological discussion of only the points bear-
ing on the issues under consideration here.
As mentioned above, the first of these cases was Cherry Lane."'
In addition to its being the first involving the use of labor-rela-
tions propaganda films and the only one in which such use is the
principal issue, it is of further importance because of its being one
of only two purely representational proceedings involved herein,
therefore not appealable directly.52 There, the employer sent pam-
phlets to his employees four days before the election. The pam-
phlets contained letters allegedly written by a minister's wife to her
mother during the course of the Princeton, Indiana, strike dram-
atized by the film "... And Women Must Weep."5 3  The pam-
48. Note 109, infra.
49. See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 1967).
50. E.g., there may have been actual discharges of employees or threats
of discharge, neither of which are exempted from unfair labor practice
action by Section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964). Further, the apparent
inapplicability of 8(c), supra, to representation proceedings gives rise to
the kinds of issues discussed in Hollywood Ceramics, to note 42, supra.
Even in Cherry Lane, the timing of the showings was at least a distracting
factor if not a principal basis of the decision; see note 56, infra.
51. Plochman and Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 130
(1962).
52. See, e.g., note 26, and discussion, supra.
53. Note 4, supra.
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phlets were followed, on the eve of the election with the showing
of the film to the employees. The record is fairly barren of what
also may have been said to the employees in the way of introduc-
tion, but that, in spite of its importance in later cases,5 4 seems to
have been of little consequence in the Regional Director's upsetting
this particular election after the employer had won.
On an appeal to the full Board,55 three decisions were written.
The majority opinion, in which Chairman McCulloch concurred, af-
firmed the Regional Director's decision. It apparently placed em-
phasis on the impact of the medium of motion pictures in influ-
encing attitudes and discussed at length the inadequate time for
union rebuttal to the film. McCulloch, however, in a footnote, ob-
served that he would have upset the election regardless of the tim-
ing of the showing of the film and the opportunity for rebuttal.56
Members Leedom and Rogers dissented, expressing serious reserva-
tions as to the likely impact of the film, regardless of its timing,
on employee choice.57
In Mason,58 another purely representational proceeding coming
the next year, the same three-way split was maintained with Mc-
Culloch writing a lengthy concurrence which has even been quoted
by the courts59 as being a fairly accurate appraisal of the film. He
observed, in part:6 0
.... It pictures a labor dispute as one in which Americanism, re-
ligion, family, motherhood, and innocent childhood are arrayed on
one side, and goons, brutes, and murderers on the other or pro-
union side.
.... The clear tendency if not the purpose in showing the film
was quite plainly, in my view, to create such an atmosphere of
emotional prejudice that employees would not be able to make a
reasoned choice . . . I do not think it material that the film was
shown 12 days before the election, rather than 1 day as in Plochman
and Harrison (Cherry Lane)....
54. E.g., Kellwood Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 20, 49 (1969).
55. In all cases, save the first two, the Board decisions were made by
a three-member panel, not a full, five-man Board; see Section 3(b), 29
U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964).
56. 140 N.L.R.B. 130, n.5 (1962).
57. 140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962).
58. Carl T. Mason Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 480 (1963).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hawthorn Co., 404 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
60. 142 N.L.R.B. at 486.
One interesting difference between this and the former case is
that the Regional Director, in assessing the impact of the film and
other anti-union propaganda on the election results (the union lost
50 to 12), determined that the employer had not gone beyond the
limits of permissible campaign propaganda. Rogers and Leedom
arrived at the same conclusion as in Cherry Lane, commenting: 61
.... We disagree (with our colleagues), and find, in accord with
the recommendations of the Regional Director that the documents
and film in question were noncoercive in nature and fall into the
category of permissible campaign propaganda.
The most noteworthy aspect of this case is that the Board seems
to have avoided the freedom of speech standards set down in Holly-
wood Ceramics(2 the previous year, and to some extent apparently
relied on in Cherry Lane,68 in two respects. Obviously, in 12 days,
as observed by McCulloch,6 4 there were plenty of opportunities for
union rebuttal of the points made in the film, although it is not
known whether the film "Anatomy of a Lie" was available for that
purpose.6 5 Also, the Board did not see fit to characterize the film
as being "so extreme as to put the employees on notice as to its
lack of truth ... "66 On the contrary, Sewel, 6 7 seems to have
been seized upon as providing the appropriate kind of test for use
in relation to the films. In fact, Sewell was specifically cited by
McCulloch in his concurring analysis of the film.68
Bannon Mills,69 coming in 1964, is the case in which the Board
skirted the issue of the film and was the first proceeding in which
the possibility of an unfair labor practice based on use of the film
was considered. In that case, the union did not proceed to an elec-
tion, but, following extensive alleged unfair labor practices of the
employer during its campaign, elected to file charges based on such
violations. Indeed, a bargaining order was sought insofar as the
union claimed to have signed a majority of employees as mem-
bers and that the employer's conduct had negated the possibility
of a fair election.70
In spite of the fact that the film was shown to employees on
seven separate occasions coupled with at least one misstatement of
61. Id. at 487.
62. See note 42 and discussion, supra.
63. See discussion preceding note 56, supra.
64. See note 60 and quotation, supra.
65. See note 49 and discussion, supra.
66. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
67. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
68. Carl T. Mason Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 480 (1963).
69. Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964).
70. Note 25 and discussion, supra.
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fact,71 the complaint failed to include a count based specifically on
the film. When the employer, at the end of the hearing, moved to
strike the evidence on this ground, the Trial Examiner refused on
the basis that not all evidence need be pled. In his report, the show-
ings of the film were held to violate Section 8(a) (1), although the
recommended order did not specifically forbid showing it.
A three member panel consisting of the majority bloc7 2 in the
preceding cases reviewed the decision. Their decision,73 with one
exception, was essentially a pro forma adoption of that of the Trial
Examiner. In a footnote,7 4 it was observed that the finding of the
violation of the Act based on the showing of the films was unnec-
essary to the result reached and was therefore dropped. This is
not surprising, for, in spite of their previously evidenced attitude
toward the film, the finding was clearly unnecessary and was po-
tentially objectionable on two grounds: (1) the procedural ground
raised before the Examiner, and (2) the substantive ground pro-
vided by Section 8(c) of the Act.7 5
Regardless of their motivation in skirting the issue in Bannon
Mills, Fanning and Brown seem to have gone out of their way to
disprove temerity in the face of Section 8 (c) in Southwire two years
later. 76 There, the employer had been using the film as part of its
orientation program for new employees for three years and, by
this and other devices, had managed to keep unions out of its plant
in spite of repeated attempts by more than one union to organize
the employees. The Trial Examiner stated that the nub of the issue
was whether the film contained a threat of reprisal and held that
its use did constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (1). He recom-
mended a cease and desist order specifically prohibiting the show-
ing of the film (in orientations or otherwise, apparently).
While the Board modified the Examiner's decision in several re-
spects and drafted a new order not specific to the film, it noted
71. 146 N.L.R.B. at 615. The Trial Examiner found that the employer
told the employees that the actors in the film were the actual participants
in the fray, although it was not filmed at that time. Cf. note 4, supra and
note 129, infra, and discussion.
72. Members McCulloch, Fanning and Brown, 146 N.L.R.B. at 615.
73. Note 69, supra.
74. Note 69, supra, at 612 (footnote 1).
75. 29 U.S.C. 158(c) (1964).
76. Southwire Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 394 (1966).
that the majority agreed with the Trial Examiner's findings in re-
spect to the film.7 7 Member Zagoria, however, finding the deter-
mination on the issue unnecessary to the result, created a two-
one split.
7 8
On appeal in the Fifth Circuit, the latter decision was affirmed
on all points save the one under consideration here.79 After noting
that the film: (1) was of potentially substantial adverse impact in
the union movement, (2) had been previously used by the Board
to upset elections, and (3) was shown to captive audiences, the
court nevertheless determined that its use was protected from un-
fair labor practice sanctions by the Section 8(c) exemption. In
short, the court held that, in spite of the Examiner's discussion of
8(c) as noted above, neither he nor the Board had sustained the
necessary burden of showing the film contained an employer threat
of reprisal or force.
While the court, in Southwire, did note the availability of the
rebuttal film, "Anatomy of a Lie," and its use by the union in that
case, it apparently regarded that factor, in a non-representation
context, to be irrelevant, thus providing further evidence of the
diversity of freedom of speech standards between representation
and unfair labor practice proceedings. Section 8(c), of course,
makes no reference to opportunity for rebuttal, and it would seem
reasonable that such opportunity would have little meaning out-
side of situations involving misstatements of fact as discussed in
Hollywood Ceramics.80 While a threat is, in most instances, a mis-
statement of fact (i.e. intention), it is not the kind of misstatement
that another party is likely to be able to rebut.
Hawthorn,8 l in 1967, was in most relevant respects quite similar
to Southwire.8 2 It, too, was decided by a three member panel of
the Board. Interestingly, Zagoria, who also sat in this case, did not
77. Id.
78. Id. at 395.
79. Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
80. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
81. Hawthorn Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 251 (1967).
82. There is, arguably in Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 240 (5th
Cir. 1967) a potential distinction. The court in Southwire noted that the
availability of the rebuttal film was not to be considered insofar as the
case was not concerned with an election, 383 F.2d at 240. The Board de-
cision, however, indicated (note 76, supra, at 395) that an election was
pending at the time of the complained of acts. In any event, neither the
Court nor the Board in Hawthorn nor Kellwood discussed any distinction
so premised in spite of the fact that the use of the film in both of these
was in an election context.
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object as he had in Southwire,8 and the unanimous Board opinion
contained an order which specifically forbade the employer's show-
ing ". . And Women Must Weep."
Kellwood, the parent company of Hawthorn, also found itself be-
fore the Board in yet another proceeding in 1969,84 which, again,
was quite similar to the Southwire situation. This time, the Board
order required the employer to cease and desist from: "Introducing
as true and showing to employees the film'... And Women Must
Weep.' ,5 (Emphasis added.)
Both Hawthorn and Kellwood were taken before the Eighth Cir-
cuit for review,8 6 and both were upset on the issue concerning the
film. The fact that the employers had told the employees watching
the films that the events shown there were accurately portrayed
by professional actors had no effect on the courts' analyses. In
Hawthorn,8 7 the court quoted Chairman McCulloch's concurrence in
Mason8  and agreed that the film was in rather poor taste, but it
also cited union use of the rebuttal film which suggested that the
campaign was in the nature of a debate which was "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" and included "vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks,"8 9 not an unfamiliar phenomenon
in labor-management controversies.
The court went on to quote extensively from the analysis of the
films in Southwire0 and concluded, as had the Fifth Circuit, that
neither the Trial Examiner nor the Board had sustained the bur-
83. Note 78 supra, but see note 82, supra. While no explanation is given
for the position taken either time, considerations discussed in note 82,
supra, would tend to explain an apparent difference in attitude.
84. Kellwood Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 20 (1969).
85. Id. at 50. It seems that this order, however, was little more than a
hollow exercise in spite of the employer's showing the film, the union won
the election (666 to 564) and was certified in 1966. The present case was
provoked when the employer then engaged in other activities which predi-
cated a strike, replaced striking employees, and proceeded to argue that
the union no longer had a majority. He lost the argument and was ordered
to bargain with the certified representative, making it rather unexpected
that he would again have cause to show the film.
86. NLRB v. Hawthorn Co., 404 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), and Kellwood
Co. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1970).
87. 404 F.2d at 1213.
88. 142 N.L.R.B. at 486.
89. 404 F.2d at 1215.
90. 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
den of showing the film to represent the management threat, re-
quired by Section 8(c), necessary to sustain an order based on a
Section 8(a) (1) unfair labor practice violation.91 Relying on this
analysis in Hawthorn, the court came to substantially the same
conclusion in Kellwood92 a year later, even though there is no
mention of union use of "Anatomy of a Lie" in the latter case.
The last case thus far to come before the courts involving this
kind of issue is Beaunit Corporation, decided by both the Board93
and the Second Circuit9 4 in 1970. In that case, the employer showed
the film to its employees twice: first to non-union-activists and,
later, to the pro-union employees. At the first showing, the em-
ployees were told that the film was a factual dramatization of events
which had transpired in a town about the size of the one in which
the current controversy was taking place. On the second showing,
the pro-union employees were told that the employer was sorry
they had not been invited to the first showing, but that they might
change their minds about the union by seeing the film at that time.
Folowing these showings of the film (which the Second Circuit
later indicated had been rebutted by the union film) an election
was held which the union lost. Interestingly, that election was up-
set on other grounds and use of the films does not seem to have
come into issue until the union filed charges seeking to have the
employer enjoined from this and other practices pending the hold-
ing of a second election. The case came before a three member
panel of the Board, and the Trial Examiner's finding that em-
ployer use of ". . . And Women Must Weep" constituted a violation
of Section 8(a) (1) was affirmed by only a two-one split.9 5 Inter-
estingly, the dissent was written by the same individual who had
so thoroughly lambasted the film in Mason 96-Chairman McCul-
loch. The report says, simply: "Member McCulloch dissents from
so much of the Decision as finds that the showing of the film '...
And Women Must Weep' is a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.",97
The Second Circuit also split, two-one, on the issue in overruling
the Board.98 The majority found itself in agreement with the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits and quoted extensively from South-
91. See notes 21, 22, and 31, supra.
92. Cases cited note 86, supra.
93. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 75 L.R.R.M. 1001 (B.N.A. 1970).
94. Luxuray of N.Y., Div'n of Beaunit Corp. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 112(2d Cir. 1971).
95. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 75 L.R.R.M. 1001 (B.N.A. 1970).
96. Note 60 and quotation, supra.
97. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 75 L.R.R.M., at 1002.
98. 447 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971).
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wire.99 After discussing the Supreme Court analysis in Gissel'00
and quoting' 0' from its own observation in Golub 10 2 that "Congress
did not intend the Board to act as a censor of the reasonableness
of statements by either party to a labor controversy," it went on
to note that the film represented neither a protected prediction nor
an unprotected threat, but was, rather, mere propaganda answer-
able by the union in normal debate.
The dissent, by Hays,10 3 also quoted Gissel and placed consider-
able emphasis on the failure of the film to convey objective fact.
Indeed, it notes that not only is the film, itself, a gross distortion
of the portrayed event, but also such distortion is further amplified
by management averments that the portrayal is an accurate one,
although dramatized. Hays noted that he would have placed
greater reliance on Board expertise than the majority allegedly did.
Unfortunately, while these objections and observations are sound
in principle, they do not seem to address themselves to the prob-
lems generated by Section 8(c) which exempts communications
from being the basis of unfair labor practice orders except when
they consist of an employer threat of reprisal or force. 10 4
In the last case to come before the Board, 05 it is interesting that
the Trial Examiner decided that the film did not convey a threat
and therefore did not furnish a basis for finding a Section 8(a) (1)
violation. Again splitting, two-one, the same majority as in Beau-
nit' 06 upset the Trial Examiner. Citing the Fifth Circuit test in
Southwire,'0 7 they held: 08
In these circumstances, we find that the showing of the film con-
stituted a clear threat of reprisal or force against the employees if
they chose the Union as their bargaining representative. Accord-
ingly, we find . . . exhibition of the film violated Section 8(a) (1)
of the Act. (Footnote omitted.)
99. 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
100. 395 U.S. 575, 616-620.
101. 447 F.2d at 117.
102. NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1967).
103. 447 F.2d at 121.
104. See note 27 et seq. and discussion, supra.
105. Spartus Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 1351 (B.N.A. 1972).
106. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 75 L.R.R.M. 1001 (B.N.A. 1970), Members
Fanning & Jenkins.
107. 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
108. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 1351 at 1353.
The dissent was filed by new Chairman Miller, who observed
that he would uphold the findings of the Trial Examiner on this
issue and concluded (in the third person) :'0
His views are in conformity with those of the various courts of ap-
peals, including .... He is of the view that free speech is not ren-
dered unprotected by other improper conduct. The other conduct
may properly be restrained, but the free speech may not.
Although it might have been," 0 this decision has not been ap-
pealed. In making a specific finding that the film constitutes a
threat, the Board does, indeed, seem to be overcoming the articu-
lated basis for the Fifth Circuit, Southwire, decision which has been
heavily relied on by the other circuits. Upsetting a decision, so
based, will apparently require overruling the Board on the facts:
an area where there should be most reliance on Board expertise if
any such area exists."'
However, the Second Circuit, in Beaunit,1 2 seems to have antici-
pated the Board coming very close to, if not arriving at, the point
of holding that, as a matter of law, ". . And Women Must Weep" is
mere propaganda and not a threat. On the one hand, as the court
observed there, the danger of threats in labor-management con-
troversies is that they are not answerable by the opposing party
(how can one counter what another says his intentions are?). On
the other hand, as the court also observed in Beaunit, the fact that
unions can and do rebut the showing of the first film with the sec,
ond, almost by definition, takes the former out of the realm of
threats. In any event, further discussion of this issue can await the
discussion of the controlled evaluation of the films which imme-
diately follows.
III. THE EXPERIMENT
It is the purpose of this discussion to detail the mechanics of the
second evaluation of the films under study as hereinbefore noted.
To that end, this section of the paper is divided into the following
descriptions of elements of that evaluation: (1) the subjects used
therein, (2) its design and the procedure for its execution, (3) the
method of statistical analysis of data collected, and (4) a discussion
of the results and their significance. These will be taken in their
respective order and illustrated with tables as appropriate.
109. Id. at footnote 4.
110. See, e.g., note 26 and discussion, supra.
111. The test usually applied is whether "substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole" supports the Board's order and the findings
it rests on; see, e.g., Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
493 (1951).
112. 447 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971).
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A. The Subjects
The persons who participated in the instant evaluation of the
films were all enrolled in a technical college. This group was
chosen because its members are preparing for the kinds of occupa-
tions where union membership is common.' 3 Their ability to em-
pathize with employees who must vote on union representation
was therefore posited. The films were shown to students in speech,
history, and psychology classes for primarily logistical reasons, and,
because all students of the college are required to take those
courses, it was expected that most of the training specialties would
be represented." 4
While a total of 73 students completed usable evaluations of the
first film, five of those subjects were not present for later testings.
Table A describes the ages and sexes of the subjects by group
tested, and Table B summarizes their then current occupations 1 5
in the aggregate.
TABLE A
AGES AND SEXES OF SUBJECTS
BY GROUPS
SEX
MALE FEMALE
GROUP F2a Flb Cc F2 F, C
Age
18 1 3 1
19 5 6 3 3 3
20 6 2 5 2
21 5 2 1
22 1 1 1
23 1 1 1.
24 1 2 1
113. Cf., note 18, supra. The programs are: nursing, law enforcement,
electrical or mechanical engineering technician, business, and computer
programming.
114. Id.
115. A substantial portion of the student population pursues a part-time
program, in fact, all of those not indicated in the Table as being "student."
30 and up
TOTAL 11 19 15
aF 2-saw both films.
bF,-saw only ". . . And Women Must Weep".
cC-saw no films.
TABLE B
OCCUPATIONS OF SUBJECTS
BY SEX
SEX
MALE
Occupation
student
police officer
sales clerk
computer operator
farmer
lab technician
construction
mechanic
tavern manager
hospital orderly
bank teller
truck driver
power serviceman
general labor
waiter
Number
15
7
4
2
2
2
3
3
FEMALE
Occupation Number
student 18
clerk 3
LPN 2
nurses aide 1
police officer 1
secretary 1
waitress 1
model 1
B. Design and Procedure
Obviously, in order to test the effect of a phenomenon expected
to produce some kind of change, it is necessary to secure measure-
ments of the parameter expected to change both before and after
the subjects have been exposed to that phenomenon. Further, if
one wants to evaluate the effects of a phenomenon independent of
possible effects of still other factors, it is imperative that precau-
tions be taken to either: (1) measure those other factors, too, or
(2) otherwise compensate for their possible presence.
1
1
11 2
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In the specific context of this experiment, that translates into:
(1) the need to evaluate the attitudes of subjects toward union rep-
resentation by testing them both before and after the showing of a
film, and (2) the need to insure that any measured changes sup-
posedly generated by the film in question have not been, in fact,
induced by some extraneous influence. For example, if subjects'
attitudes are measured at point X in time, and it is anticipated
that a further attempt will be made to influence them at later point
Y, it is important to guard against the effects of interim influences,
such as the mere passage of time.1 1 6
The design here used to account for those matters is reflected
in Figure 1 where information concerning three groups of subjects
is presented: Fl, F2, and C. A study of that figure will show that
group F2 was the most manipulated and was shown both films in
question. Those subjects, in light of the above discussion, were,
therefore, tested before each showing to control for their attitudes
at that time, whatever they might be. Further, the testing of that
FIGURE I
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
GROUP FILM
Ie IIF
Before After Before After
Fla  31d 31 28 -
F 2b 25 25 23 23
Cc 17 - 17 -
TOTAL 73 56 68 23
aF,-group saw only the first film.
bF2-group saw both films.
cC -group saw neither film.
d -numbers in the cells represent the number of subjects completing
questionnaires.
e -Film I-" . . . And Women Must Weep".
f -Film II-"Anatomy of a Lie".
116. See, e.g., note 118 and discussion, infra. Another matter to con-
sider is the possibility of sufficient ambiguity in the attitudes of the popu-
lation to cause vote changes without any particular intervening stimulus.
group before the second film gave some indication of the amount
of dissipation of influence the first film suffered from the time of its
showing." 7
To this point, both F, and F2 were treated the same. F2, how-
ever, was then shown the second film and, later, again tested to
evaluate its additional impact on their attitudes toward union
representation. F1, which merely buttresses the data of F2 up to
the time of the showing of the second movie, thus reflects no
"after" data for the second film. The situation with the C group is
similar. Because that group saw neither the first nor the second
film, no "after" data was taken either time. The presence of the
C group in the design reflects an effort to control for extraneous
environmental influences between the time of the first and second
showings, e.g. an intervening newspaper story that might be inor-
dinately pro-or anti-union.""
All showings of films and collection of data were accomplished in
the respective class sessions for the groups on the same day.119
The second film was shown to F2 two weeks later, and, again, all
data for the groups was collected in class at that time.
The data concerning attitudes toward union representation was
collected by means of a questionnaire which is reproduced in Ap-
pendix A of this paper. Verbal communications were kept to a min-
imum, and requests for directions and information were referred
to the document. There, the subjects were asked to cooperate, to
supply a minimum of personal information (name, age, sex, and oc-
cupation) and to put themselves in the position of an employee who
must decide whether he wants to join a union after both it and the
employer have conducted a campaign to capture employee senti-
ment. The raw data thus collected is summarized in Table C.
C. Statistical Analysis
Fortunately, an exceptionally appropriate statistical procedure
was available for use in evaluating the significance of the data
collected: "The McNemar Test for the Significance of Changes.' 2
0
117. If the behavior of group C is compared. Insofar as the entire sub-
ject population is geographically cohesive, it is assumed that any significant
intervening simulus will be reflected in the voting patterns of group C.
There was no such significant change registered for that group; therefore,
it can be reasonably assumed that the other groups were likewise unaf-
fected by extraneous circumstances.
118. Id.
119. Monday, May 22nd, 1972.
120. E.g., SIEGEL, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIOR SCIENCES,
63 (McGraw-Hill: N.Y., 1956).
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TABLE C
RAW DATA
Group
Beforec Afterd Chle Nf Before Afterd Ch2g Ch3h N
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Fli  20 8 20 8 4 28 19 9 -128
2 1 2 1 0 3 00 -- - -
F2J 10 10 10 10 0 20 10 10 10 10 0 0 20
3 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Ck 11 6 17 11 6 0 - 17
TO'L. 47 26 35 21 5 73 40 28 11 12 2 1 68
a-Represents the time at which "... And Women Must Weep" was shown.
(film one)
b-Represents the time at which "Anatomy of a Lie" was shown.
c-Numbers in the colums indicate the subjects responding in the indicated
manner.
d-Blank spaces indicate the subjects in the indicated group did not see
the film in question.
a-Change period 1: shows absolute number of subjects changing their
vote before and after the first film.
f-Shows the number of subjects involved.
g-Change period 2: absolute vote change during time span from after
film one to before film two.
h--Change period 3: change from before to after film two.
L-Saw only film one. 3 subjects indicated below did not participate in
the second part of the experiment.
i-Saw both films. Subjects in second line did not participate in both
parts of the experiment.
k--Saw neither film.
That test has been categorized as follows:'
2
'
The McNemar test for the significance of changes is particularly
applicable to those 'before' and 'after' designs in which each per-
son is used as his own control and in which measurement is in
121. Id. Incidentally, measurement here was on a nominal scale, i.e. a
simple vote count. An ordinal scale is one in which measurements are
ranked, rather than being a simple "yes" or "no."
the strength of either a nominal or ordinal scale. Thus it might
be used to test the effectiveness of a particular treatment . . . on
voters' preferences. . . (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, it was used for each group, separately, and for the
aggregate of subjects for each of four possible change periods: (1)
before to after the first film, (2) after the first to before the second,
(3) before to after the second film, and (4) before the first film to
just before the second film. The results of that analysis for each
group and change period, as defined above, is given in Table D in
terms of probability values, p. By convention, if p is equal to or
less than 0.05, the results are said to be statistically significant.
Conversely, values larger than 0.05 are insignificant indicating that
whatever changes registered were likely registered as a product of
chance.12 1
TABLE D
RESULTS OF McNEMAR TEST
Change Period
Group 1 2 3 4
F, 0.99 0.99 - 0.99
F2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.40
C ....
Whole 123  0.99 0.30 - 0.40
D. Results and Discussion
As noted before, the raw data for this experiment is summarized
in Table C. An examination of it and Table D will reveal that,
while there were a few changes in voting behavior between the
various testing times, not only will the unskilled observer find
them quite small,124 but also the more expert will find them to be,
within the context of the procedure used, the product of chance
not of systematic impact of either of the films or both.
122. E.g., SIEGEL, note 120, supra, generally.
123. There are no results in period 3 because there was no data from
more than one group to combine.
124. While there were five changed votes over the course of the experi-
ment in group F1, the net overall change was only one vote lost for the
union-in spite of the second film's not being shown. For F2, there was
a total of only three votes changed. Prior to the showing of the second
film, the union had lost 2 votes, one of which was recaptured by showing
the second film. One individual shown there changed his vote twice as
indicated, and his and another individual's votes are separated from the
group so that it may be determined which way the votes were shifting from
point to point.
[VOL. 1: 21, 1973] Labor Union Propaganda Films
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
While it cannot be analyzed systematically, much less statisti-
cally, there is some subjective data bearing on the legitimacy of
these results. Subjects were allowed to comment freely on their
reaction to the films, and those comments are worthy of mention.
Four students, for example, who should have been members of the
control group (which saw neither film) refused to participate,
maintaining that they had inadequate information upon which to
base a voting decision.
12 5
Other subjects made written comments on the questionnaires.
These seem to present a failure to be impressed with the first
film. 126 While few commented on the fact that the films dealt
with an ostensibly nonrelevant issue, i.e., right-to-work legisla-
tion,1 27 many indicated a feeling that the first film, in particular,
was dated. 12 8 Many, too, felt that the first film was so melodra-
matic that it was discounted, and laughter was reported at several
points during its showing.
125. In a role-playing experimental procedure, it is required that a
subject be given only general directions and be forced to rely on his own
experiences and attitudes to supply the specifics. Hence the question-
naires (Appendix A, infra) were deliberately non-committal and unin-
formative. There is no way to determine whether non-responsiveness by
these individuals is a product of ambiguity toward unions or an unwilling-
ness to commit their biases to paper. In any event, this is a widely recog-
nized method of industrial psychologists and others; see, e.g., MAIER, PSY-
CHOLOGY IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, 322-23 (Houghton Mifflin: Boston,
1973).
126. One subject, for example, wrote: "All unions do not have this
effect or let this happen. It resulted from non-organized union." Another
said, "I didn't change my vote because every union does not operate like
that." See also note 128, infra.
127. Note 10, and discussion, supra.
128. One student wrote, "Times have changed; they aren't like this any-
more. Actually, unions keep management in there (sic) places so they
won't take advantage of you." Quite a few expressed the opinion that the
cars, fashions, etc., shown in the first film were of vintage quality. It is
difficult to assess the impact this had on an admittedly fairly young group
of subjects (see Table A) nor the likely impact on an older group of indi-
viduals. In any event, this problem seems to have been anticipated by the
National Right To Work Committee, note 17, supra. They have a new work
available called "The Springfield Gun," a 16mm color, 25 minute film,
renting for $25.00. While this film has not yet shown up in labor cases,
it can be expected from the following flyer description:
"A Motion Picture Sequel to the Emotionally Overpowering"
AND WOMEN MUST WEEP ... A saga of COMPULSION ...
"The Springfield Gun" is more than a recording of the facts sur-
rounding those grim days in early 1969 when a bullet was fired into
the brain of a 10-year-old child as part of a violence ridden strike
called to enforce demands for a compulsory union shop. .. "
Therefore, there was ample subjective as well as objective evi-
dence to suggest that the propaganda value of the first film was so
low, there was little for the second film to rebut. Hence, those
who saw the second film were not surprised at being told therein,
e.g., that the local union leader and alleged instigator of much of
the trouble depicted in the first film was a partially blind, elderly
woman-not a burly, young man.129
It remains to discuss the significance of these findings in the
remainder of the paper.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As has been hereinabove discussed, the rules for application of
freedom of speech standards to matters before the NLRB requires,
first, a determination of the kind of proceeding involved. In unfair
labor practice actions, in which a cease and desist order may be
entered, one must contend with the provisions of Section 8 (c), ex-
empting non-coercive communications from being the basis of en-
forceable orders.
In such proceedings, as was discussed in Southwire'30 and later
elaborated in, e.g., Beaunit,13' it becomes necessary to categorize a
communication as a threat, a promise, or mere propaganda. Of the
three, only the first is subject to enforceable Board orders. A "pre-
diction" is distinguished from a "threat" in a certain class of situa-
tions within which the one under current discussion probably does
not fall. For example, an employer may engage in permissible,
though admittedly coercive, predictions concerning the likely ad-
verse economic impact of unionization on its plant. 13 2 Likewise, in
very limited circumstances, an employer can tell employees that a
decision has been reached, where indeed it has, to close the plant
in the event of unionization. 33
As was discussed in Beaunit,13 4 however, a film depicting a possi-
bility of union violence falls neither within the realm of threats
nor within that of predictions. It is not the former because that
term, in the context of its use in labor relations, has come to mean
129. That is not to say that women are incapable of hotheaded and rash
acts, it only shows short-sightedness on the part of the makers to use such
easily disproven distortion.
130. See note 76 and discussion, supra.
131. See note 94 and discussion, supra.
132. See, e.g., note 25, supra, at 616-20, and the discussion corresponding
to note 34, supra.
133. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
134. See note 94 and discussion, supra.
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a misrepresentation of the employer's intention to do something,
itself, in the event of unionization.135 Insofar as the showing of the
film, ". . . And Women Must Weep," cannot be reasonably con-
strued as an employer promise of doing anything itself, the appli-
cation of the term, "threat", to the showing of the film is im-
proper.13 6
For approximately the same reasons, the use of the term, "pre-
diction", as it has come to be defined in the context of this par-
ticular dichotomy, is likewise improper. While the showing of the
film may be loosely labeled a "prediction", in the context of stand-
ard usage, it is, again, not such within the context of labor usage
because there is no implication of employer action. Quite the con-
trary, it is a suggestion of union action which may be adverse to
the best interests of the employees. 137
This leaves the term, "propaganda", for discussion. Clearly the
film is propaganda, and, as such, it may be classified as: (1) ra-
tional and relevant or irrational, irrelevant and inflammatory;
(2) rebuttable or irrebuttable; and/or (3) true or false. However,
regardless of its classification in those categories, it is still not a
threat as that term has been heretofore defined and is, therefore,
employer-employee communication exempted from action under
Section 10 by Section 8(c) of the Act.138
In Section 9 proceedings, nevertheless, as has also been discussed
beginning with General Shoe,189 the situation is quite different.
There, not only are threats the basis for upsetting an employer-won
election, but material misstatements of fact, even innocent mis-
statements of fact,140 may provide such a basis under the proper
circumstances. Further, in apparently limited circumstances, espe-
cially inflammatory and emotional propaganda may provide a ba-
sis for upsetting an election.
Assuming arguendo that ". . . And Women Must Weep" is irrele-
vant, irrational, and potentially inflammatory, and, further, assum-
135. Note 132, supra.
136. See note 94 and discussion, supra.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
140. E.g., Bausch & Lomb, note 44, supra. In that case, it was held that
the Board could properly upset an election even where the misrepresenta-
tion was in good faith.
ing it contains material misrepresentations, matters remaining for
discussion here include: (1) the propriety of Board action with
respect to the film in light of its own rules, and (2) the impact
of the present study on the application of those rules to films such
as the one primarily in question.
If ". . . And Women Must Weep" is regarded as primarily a mis-
representation of fact, i.e., material misrepresentations,'141 the latter
being particularly arguable, 142 an employer should not be subject
to an election upset if there is adequate time for union rebuttal.14 3
Clearly, if sufficient time is allowed for rebuttal with "Anatomy
of a Lie," the standards of, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics, 44 are met.
However, if such time is not allowed, it might be very well justi-
fied not only to upset an election but also to issue a cease and de-
sist order pending a second one-based not on the communications,
per se, but rather on the act of showing it within a proscribed pe-
riod of time of the election.145
Unfortunately, contrary to what was apparently a false start in
Cherry Lane, 46 the Board seems to have veered away from such
an approach to the problem beginning with Mason. 47 Even this
much is not certain, for, if "Anatomy of a Lie" had been available
for use in Mason,148 it is possible, on the one hand, that a different
result might have been reached. On the other hand, however, in
subsequent cases-ones in which the rebuttal film was available 49
-time was not discussed as a relevant issue.
141. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
142. See, e.g., note 129 and discussion, supra. Is such a misrepresenta-
tion material?
143. Cf., NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1972).
This is an interesting case, further illustrating points made by note 26 and
discussion, supra. There, after union misrepresentations of fact, the union
won an election. The employer objected in a representation proceeding, but
his objections were not found sound and the union was certified. The
employer refused to bargain with the union and an unfair labor practice
action was brought in which the employer tried to raise the issue again.
The Trial Examiner granted summary judgment on the issue and issued a
bargaining order and was "affirmed" by the Board. The court refused to
enforce the order, indicating that more than an opportunity to rebut is
needed where such rebuttal would be ineffective if made.
144. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
145. See, e.g., note 33 and discussion, supra. This approach would seem
to be technically not forbidden by Section 8(c), but no cases are known
attempting it. Such an approach might save some time and avoid some
of the problems discussed in re note 26, supra.
146. 140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962).
147. 142 N.L.R.B. 480 (1963).
148. Note 49 and discussion, supra.
149. Id.
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In spite of rather cogent criticism of such rules,150 an approach
along the lines of Sewell'51 seems to have been retained, condemn-
ing the film for its injection of arguably irrational and emotional
issues into the representation campaign. Because of its insistence
on regarding the film as a "threat" which it clearly isn't, it is quite
impossible, however, to determine what the Board really thinks.152
Regardless of feelings toward the film, per se, it is the conclusion
here that the continued use of film showings to upset elections,
much less as a basis for cease and desist orders, is in most cases,
a squandering of precious manpower and, in others, may actually
be punitive.
In the first place, while the experiment herein described may be
the subject of some criticism, 5 3 its results would seem to reason-
ably meet the burden of showing the impact of the film, with or
without the rebuttal film, to be, at best, minimal.154  In any event,
there is at least one case on record where a union won by a sub-
stantial majority in spite of employer use of the first film.155
In the second place, in situations where cease and desist orders
are otherwise appropriate to insure a clean second election (legal
arguments aside), it may be observed that an order in re the film
is a waste of time once the employer has already shown the film. 5
What could be gained from a second showing?
Finally, even in a pure representation context, the upsetting of
elections following the use of the film is, moreover, unwarranted.
Again, with or without rebuttal and regardless of its irrational and
arguably deceptive appeals, the film has been demonstrated inef-
fective toward its intended end. 57 Given this, and given that the
employer's campaign has been otherwise proper, what can be
gained from upsetting an election which must have (in spite of the
film) been won on the merits? At best, such an upset is an exer-
cise in futility and, at worst, as has been previously intimated, it
150. Bok, note 7, supra at 73-74.
151. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
152. Spartus Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 79 L.R.R.M. 1351 (B.N.A. 1972).
153. E.g., note 128, supra.
154. Note 124 and discussion, supra.
155. Note 85, supra.
156. Id.
157. Note 124 and discussion, supra.
may unfairly and improperly penalize the employer: this follows
from the observation that employee knowledge that the NLRB has
seen fit to upset an employer-won election quite possibly will fix,
and improperly so, in their minds that the employer is a scoun-
drel.' 58
In addition, if a general remark can be tolerated at this point, it
may be observed in ultimate conclusion that, had the NLRB done
more than pay lip service to "laboratory conditions" and "experi-
ments"'159 over the past decade, untold thousands of dollars and
man-hours could have been more fruitfully spent. 160 Agencies,
e.g., the NLRB, whose function it is to acquire expertise'" to the
end of guiding policy and shaping the law, would do well to make
better and more extensive use of well-known and documented tech-
niques in the acquisition of that expertise. 1 62  Further, a study
such as the present will carry far more weight when done under
the auspices of a given agency than will be the case if such data
is presented by a party in controversy with the agency in an ad-
versary proceeding, and the costs incurred will be more equitably
distributed among the beneficiaries of such studies, e.g., the pub-
lic.163
158. In spite of the observation in the quotation corresponding to note
27, supra, the Board posts notices informing employees of the reasons for
an election upset. Interesting research could be done on the impact that
this information would have on employee attitudes.
159. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
160. Bok, note 7, supra, at 42, indicates that rules for upsetting elections
have often been founded on "little more than naked assertions that various
tactics tended to interfere with the election process. As one might expect,
decisions of this kind have generally proved unconvincing and unstable."
Op. cit., pp. 73-74.
161. See, e.g., note 103 and discussion, supra.
162. Discussing the NLRB in the area, generally, Bok, note 7, supra, at
45, states:
So long as rules are justified solely in terms of the need for pro-
tecting the voters from improper influence, opinions are bound to
be rather thinly explained, for a careful analysis of the facts will
too often expose the uncertainties on which so many of these con-
clusions ultimately rest. To avoid these unruly facts, various
assumptions of doubtful validity must be introduced if the opinion
is to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. It will be necessary
to posit the goal of maintaining "laboratory conditions" in elec-
tion campaigns, an objective that no seasoned observer considers
realistic ....
163. See, e.g., the quotation corresponding to note 45, supra.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
NOTE:
Your help in supplying the information asked for here will be
very much appreciated. It is important that you put your name
in the space provided-so that the information can be properly
handled. In any event, all information which you furnish here
will be kept in strictest confidence and will not be associated with
your name except for tabulating purposes. These sheets will be
destroyed in about a month's time.
QUESTIONS:
Name:
Sex (M or F): Age:
Occupation (if part-time, please indicate):
PROBLEM:
Assume that you are an hourly worker in a plant in Smalltown,
U.S.A. You are not a member of any labor organization, but there
is a membership drive being conducted by a union at your plant.
The union has promised all sorts of advantages of membership in
their organization. Your employer has tried to combat the member-
ship drive by telling you and the employees why you don't need a
union. After you have had a chance to consider all the pros and
cons of joining a union, using all of the information that you have,
how will you act? Please mark one of the following:
I will join the union.
I will not join the union.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!
